T he statement that computer networks executing essentially the same software (for example, a software's various versions and configurations, such as Linux or Windows) present a higher risk of cascading failures than more diversified networks when a serious vulnerability is discovered in that common software has two inherent problems. The first problem is with the concept of "essentially the same software," and the second is with the meaning of "cascading failures."
The same software
It is assumed that by the term "essentially the same software" we mean that we can, for example, logically aggregate all Microsoft operating systems into one group of essentially the same software and all Linux software into another group of essentially the same software. This assumption is not valid for classifying underlying vulnerabilities. Microsoft software alone can be found in a bewildering combination of base operating systems (for example, Windows 95, Windows XP, Windows NT, Windows Server 2003, and so on), revision levels, enhancements, and patch states. Similarly, the Linux operating system exists in different builds, packages, revisions, and patch states. Each of these variables is a factor in the likelihood of a computer being vulnerable to a particular exploit. Variation in Internet facing functions such as browsers, Web services, and network stacks has a similar effect on vulnerabilities and exists in as wide a variety of configurations as the underlying operating systems.
Variations in the tools (for example, compilers, linkers, and so on) will also introduce distinct differences in the code that they process. Some of these differences have profound effects on the underlying code's vulnerability. For example, the current version of the Microsoft Visual C compiler includes a switch that compiles in stack overflow protection. Code derived from compilation with the switch turned on will have very different characteristics than code compiled without the switch.
Recent attacks verify the effects of this inherent diversity in the apparently identical operating system environment. Each operating system vendor's security bulletins have a description of affected systems. Rarely is it the complete collection of operating systems and configurations for a given vulnerability.
Attacks occur against "computer systems," not against "operating systems." That is, the operating system, Internet services, and tools are only components of the computer system as seen from the network. Firewalls, antivirus software, configuration management software, intrusion detection software, and any other software might negate or mitigate a given vulnerability's effects.
The computer system also includes the hardware on which the software is running. Microprocessor manufacturers have been including hardware-enforced execution controls in their latest lines of microprocessors. Clearly, software running on such machines will have different vulnerability characteristics than those running on hardware without hardware constraints.
Cascade failures
Commonality does exist with the many standards that underpin Internet communications such as TCP/IP, the Domain Name System (DNS), Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), and others. These protocols' vulnerabilities will transcend all operating systems and application software variations. Cascade failures, by definition, occur as one system's failure influences or causes that of another. It applies to operating systems only to the extent that the operating system itself participates in the attack's spread, as has been the case with recent worms. Even so, the system environment is not static. Administrators or programs operating on their behalf can modify or adapt the environment in real time to negate or mitigate attacks by closing a firewall port, updating an antivirus signature, patching the affected software, or even disconnecting the system from the network.
Lastly, there are practical reasons for trying to limit the number of different configurations of computing environments in an organization. The primary reason is to ease the management burden on the system's administrators. Indeed, this has been the main driving force for "essentially the same software" through an enterprise. Part of that management burden is the management of those systems' security. If you assume, as a logical conclusion to the opening statement, that each machine in an organization should differ to reduce the potential cascade failure within the organization, then the administrative burden of maintaining basic security within the organization's computer systems would surely constitute a greater risk than anything potentially gained by the differentiation. • Microsoft's systems are not as alike as they seem.
• Standards represent a monopoly-driven monoculture.
• Systems administrators rely on identicality.
So, let's melt them one by one. an interface standard is a necessary precondition for implementation diversity. Unless you believe that security flaws are deliberate, they must be unintentional implementation faults. A diversity of implementation generates a diversity of implementation faults. In other words, the fact that you can speak XYZML to some application doesn't imply that there is a predictable implementation flaw to exploit. Bingo, cascade quenching.
Third, it is patently true that nothing is as easy to manage as a thousand identical platforms-at least in a perfect world in which there are no evil people and every employee is competent. Try asking a systems administrator how much of his or her life is spent on patch management, and how all that lovely identicality contributes to firedrills and worse. By now, everyone knows that the total cost of operation for a desktop has nothing to do with the dollars spent up through the first keystroke. No, total cost of ownership (TCO) is dominated by change control-broadly definedand no change is as expensive as trying to patch, patch, and repatch systems in the face of complexity.
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